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Abstract
Successful negotiators look beyond a purely utilitarian
view. We propose a new agent architecture that was inspired
by the observation that “Everything that an agent says gives
away (valuable) information.” It is intended for agents who
are uncertain about their environment. Information-based
agency uses tools from information theory, and includes
techniques for managing information exchange including:
the acceptance of contracts, the estimation of trust, relia-
bility, honour and confidence.
1 Introduction
An agency framework is grounded in information-based
concepts [4]; it aims to provide a basis for managing the un-
certainties that pervade real-world negotiation such as ePro-
curement contract negotiation. In so far as uncertainty is the
problem, information is the solution — “It’s what you know
that matters”. Information-based agency provides a range
of tools and techniques that enable agents to manage their
information resources, including the proactive acquisition
of information, in the presence of pervasive uncertainty.
We assume that a multiagent system
{α, β1, . . . , βo, ξ, θ1, . . . , θt}, contains an agent α that
interacts with negotiating agents, βi, information providing
agents, θj , and an institutional agent, ξ, that represents the
institution where we assume the interactions happen [1].
Institutions give a normative context to interactions that
simplify matters (e.g. an agent can’t make an offer, have it
accepted, and then renege on it). Agents have an internal
language L used to build a probabilistic world model.
The world model, Mt consists of probability distribu-
tions that represent the agent’s (uncertain) beliefs about
the world. These distributions are in effect summaries of
the observations that the agent has made. Information-
based agents also construct coarse-grained summary mea-
sures (e.g. trust, reputation, and reliability [6]) that can then
be used to define strategies for “exchanging information”
— in the sense developed here, this is the only thing that an
agent can do.
Agent α receives all utterances expressed in C in an in-
box X where they are time-stamped and sourced-stamped.
An utterance u from agent β (or θ or ξ) is then moved from
X to a percept repository Yt where it is appended with a
subjective belief function Rt(α, β, u) that normally decays
with time. α acts in response to an utterance that expresses
a need. A need may be exogenous such as a need to trade
profitably and may be triggered by another agent offering to
trade, or endogenous such as α deciding that it owns more
wine than it requires. Needs trigger α’s goal/plan proactive
reasoning described in Section 2, other messages are dealt
with by α’s reactive reasoning described in Section 3.
2 Proactive Reasoning
Each plan contains constructors for a world modelMt that
consists of probability distributions, Xi, in first-order prob-
abilistic logic L. Mt is then maintained from percepts re-
ceived using update functions that transform percepts into
constraints onMt — described in Section 3.
The distributions inMt are determined by α’s plans that
are in turn determined by its needs. If α is negotiating some
contract δ in satisfaction of need χ then it may require the
distribution Pt(eval(α, β, χ, δ) = ei) where for a particular
δ, eval(α, β, χ, δ) is an evaluation over some complete and
disjoint evaluation space E = (e1, . . . , en) that may con-
tain hard (possibly utilitarian) values, or fuzzy values such
as “reject” and “accept”. This distribution assists α’s strate-
gies to decide whether to sign a proposed contract leading
to a probability of signing Pt(sign(α, β, χ, δ)). This is dis-
cussed further in Section ??.
α’s plans may construct various other distributions such
as: Pt(trade(α, β, o) = ei) that β is a good person to sign
contracts with in context o, Pt(confide(α, β, o) = fj) that
α can trust β with confidential information in context o, and
any other distribution as required.
The integrity of percepts decreases in time. α may have
background knowledge concerning the expected integrity of
a percept as t → ∞. Such background knowledge is rep-
resented as a decay limit distribution, D(Xi), for the ran-
dom variable Xi. If the background knowledge is incom-
plete then one possibility is for α to assume that the decay
limit distribution has maximum entropy whilst being con-
sistent with the data. In practice, the decay limit distribu-
tion may be known. For example, if Xi represents α’s be-
liefs about tomorrow’s weather then the published averages
of the weather for that time of year may be used to generate
D(Xi).
Given a distribution, P(Xi), and a decay limit distribu-
tion D(Xi), P(Xi) decays by:
Pt+1(Xi) = ∆i(D(Xi),Pt(Xi)) (1)
where ∆i is the decay function for the Xi satisfying the
property that limt→∞ Pt(Xi) = D(Xi). For example, ∆i
could be linear: Pt+1(Xi) = (1−νi)×D(Xi)+νi×Pt(Xi),
where νi < 1 is the decay rate for the i’th distribution. Ei-
ther the decay function or the decay limit distribution could
also be a function of time: ∆ti and Dt(Xi).
3 Reactive Reasoning
In the absence of in-coming utterances the integrity ofMt
decays by Equation 1. The following procedure updates
Mt for all percepts expressed in language C. Suppose that
α receives a message u from agent β at time t. Suppose that
this message states that something is so with probability z,
and suppose that α attaches an epistemic belief Rt(α, β, u)
to u — this probability is α’s estimate of β’s confidence
that reflects α’s level of personal caution. Each of α’s
active plans, s, contains constructors for a set of distribu-
tions {Xi} ⊆ Mt together with associated update func-
tions, Js(·), such that JXis (u) is a set of linear constraints
on the posterior distribution for Xi. Examples of these up-
date functions are given in Section ??.
Denote the prior distribution Pt(Xi) by ~p, and let ~p(u)
be the distribution with minimum relative entropy1 with re-






constraints JXis (u). Then let ~q(u) be the distribution:
1Given a probability distribution ~q, the minimum relative entropy dis-
tribution ~p = (p1, . . . , pI) subject to a set of J linear constraints ~g =
{gj(~p) = ~aj ·~p−cj = 0}, j = 1, . . . , J (that must include the constraintP





. This may be calculated





+ ~λ · ~g.
MinimisingL, { ∂L
∂λj
= gj(~p) = 0}, j = 1, . . . , J is the set of given con-
straints ~g, and a solution to ∂L
∂pi
= 0, i = 1, . . . , I leads eventually to ~p.
Entropy-based inference is a form of Bayesian inference that is convenient
when the data is sparse [2] and encapsulates common-sense reasoning [5].




~q(u) if ~q(u) is more interesting than ~p
~p otherwise
(3)
A general measure of whether ~q(u) is more interesting than




is the Kullback-Leibler distance between two
probability distributions ~x and ~y.
Finally, merging Equation 3 and Equation 1, we obtain
the method for updating a distribution Xi on receipt of an
utterance u:
Pt+1(Xi) = ∆i(D(Xi),Pt(Xi(u))) (4)
This procedure deals with integrity decay, and with two
probabilities: first, the probability z in the percept u, and
second the belief Rt(α, β, u) that α attached to u. Equa-
tion 3 is intended to prevent weak information from de-
creasing the certainty of Pt+1(Xi).
3.1 Confidence
The confidence estimate, Rt(α, β, u), mentioned in the
previous section is an epistemic probability that takes ac-
count of α’s personal caution. An empirical estimate of
Rt(α, β, u) may be obtained by measuring the ‘difference’
between commitment and enactment. Suppose that utter-
ance u is received from agent β at time t entailing a commit-
ment Commit(β, α, ϕ), e.g. u = Accept(β, α, ϕ, t) (and
is verified by ξ as u′ = Inform(ξ, α,Observe(ξ, ϕ′), t′) at
some later time t′. Denote the prior Pt(Xi) by ~p. Let ~p(u)
be the posterior minimum relative entropy distribution sub-
ject to the constraints JXis (u), and let ~p(u′) be that distribu-
tion subject to JXis (u
′). We now estimate what Rt(α, β, u)
should have been in the light of knowing now, at time t′,
that ϕ should have been ϕ′.
The idea of Equation 2, is thatRt(α, β, u) should be such
that, on average across Mt, ~q(u) will predict ~p(u′) — no
matter whether or not u was used to update the distribu-
tion for Xi, as determined by the condition in Equation 3 at
time t′. The observed confidence for u and distribution Xi,
RtXi(α, β, u)|u′, on the basis of the verification of u with
u′, is the value of k that minimises the Kullback-Leibler
distance:
RtXi(α, β, u)|u′ = arg mink K(k · ~p(u) + (1− k) · ~p ‖ ~p(u′))
The predicted information in the enactment of u with re-
spect to Xi is:
ItXi(α, β, u) = H
t(Xi)−Ht(Xi(u)) (5)
that is the reduction in uncertainty in Xi where H(·) is
Shannon entropy. Equation 5 takes account of the value of
Rt(α, β, u).
If X(u) is the set of distributions that u affects, then the
observed confidence of β on the basis of the verification of
u with u′ is:
Rt(α, β, u)|u′ = 1|X(u)|
∑
i
RtXi(α, β, u)|u′ (6)
If X(u) are independent the predicted information in u is:
It(α, β, u) =
∑
Xi∈X(u)
ItXi(α, β, u) (7)
Suppose α utters u to β where u is α’s private information,
then assuming that β’s reasoning apparatus mirrors α’s, α
can also estimate It(β, α, u).
For each commitment Commit(β, α, ϕ) established at
time t and derived from an utterance u that has been veri-
fied with as Observe(α,ϕ′) derived from u′, the observed
confidence that α has for agent β in ϕ is:
Rt+1(α, β, ϕ) = (1− ν)× Rt(α, β, ϕ)+
ν × Rt(α, β, u)|u′ × Sim(ϕ,ϕ′)
where Sim measures the semantic distance between two
sections of the ontology, and ν is the learning rate. Over
time, α notes the context of the various Commit(β, α, ϕ)
derived from utterances u received from β, and over
the various contexts calculates the relative frequency,
Pt(Commit(β, α, ϕ)).
4 Uncertain Information
Agent α’s world model, Mt, at time t is a set of random
variables,Mt = {Xi, . . . , Xn} each representing an aspect
of the world that α is interested in. In a multiagent system it
is natural to measure the uncertainty of a random variable in
terms of the cost, in some sense, of communicating the true
value of it from one agent to another. One such sense is the
lower bound on the expected number of binary questions
that are always guaranteed to discover the true value of a
random variable, X; this is given by the entropy, H(X) =∑
i−pi log pi, where the pi are values of the probability
mass function for X , [4].
When a negotiation terminates it is normal for agents to
review what the cost of the negotiation ex post; for example,
“I got him to sign up, but had to tell him about our plans
to close our office in Girona”. It is not feasible to define
the value of information in terms of the value derived from
subsequent enactments that may have benefited from that
information unless those subsequent enactments are known
in advance. Without knowing what use the recipient will
make of the “Girona information”, it is not possible to relate
the value of this act of information revelation to the value
of outcomes and so to preferences.
If β passes an utterance to α, α evaluates this act in two
ways. First, it is valued for the strategic significance of the
information that it contains, precisely it is measured as the
expected increase in utility that α expects to enjoy given
that it has the information. Second, it is valued because
the sending agent was prepared to divulge the information
in the utterance, precisely it is measured as the decrease
in uncertainty that the receiving agent has over the sending
agent’s private information — this is the information mea-
sure. All utterances received are qualified by α with a con-
fidence belief probability as described in Section 3. From
α’s point of view, β’s private information is everything that
β knows and that α does not know with certainty. Due to
the persistent effect of Equation 1, this will include much of
what β knows.
α’s world model, Mt, is a set of probability distribu-
tions. If at time t, α receives an utterance u that may alter
this world model (as described in Section 3) then the (Shan-
non) information in u with respect to the distributions in
Mt is: It+1(u) = H(Mt)−H(Mt+1). Let N t ⊆ Mt be
α’s model of agent β. If β sends the utterance u to α then
the information about β within u is: H(N t)−H(N t+1).
5 Uncertainty in Enactment
If an agent signs a contract it is then committed to enact
its commitments in that contract. If an agent transmits in-
formation it is implicitly committed to the world being in
some state when conditions hold — e.g. “If you open that
bottle of wine Carles will be furious.” If an agent makes
a threat or offers a reward — e.g. “If you purchase all of
your eggs from me I will give you a 20% discount.” — then
this too commits the speaker to ensuring that the world is in
some state under certain conditions. In summary, all infor-
mation that an agent communicates will one way or another
be a commitment or a promise that the world or the agents
in it will be, are, or have been in certain states possibly sub-
ject to associated conditions being true. If agent α receives
a commitment from β, α will be interested in any varia-
tion between β’s commitment, ϕ, and what is actually ob-
served (or is advised by the institution agent ξ), as the enact-
ment, ϕ′. We denote the relationship between commitment
and enactment, Pt(Observe(α,ϕ′)|Commit(β, α, ϕ)) sim-
ply as Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) ∈Mt.
In the absence of in-coming utterances the conditional
probabilities, Pt(ϕ′|ϕ), should tend to ignorance as repre-
sented by the decay limit distribution and Equation 1. We
now show how Equation 4 may be used to revise Pt(ϕ′|ϕ)
as observations are made. Let the set of possible enact-
ments be {ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕm} ⊆ Φ with prior distribution
~p = Pt(ϕ′|ϕ). Suppose that utterance u is received, we
estimate the posterior ~p(u) = (p(u)i)mi=1 = Pt+1(ϕ′|ϕ), as
follows.
First, if u ∈ C entails that ϕk is observed then α may use
this observation to estimate p(ϕk)k as having some value d at
time t+1. We then estimate the distribution ~p(ϕk) by apply-
ing the principle of minimum relative entropy as in Equa-
tion 4 with prior ~p, and the posterior ~p(ϕk) = (p(ϕk)j)
m
j=1
satisfying the single constraint: J (ϕ
′|ϕ)(ϕk) = {p(ϕk)k =
d}.
Second, we consider the effect that the enactment φ′ of
another commitment φ, also by agent β, has on ~p. This
is achieved by appealing to the structure of the ontology
using the Sim(·) function. Given Observe(α, φ′) after
Commit(β, α, φ) define the vector ~s by
si = Pt(ϕi|ϕ)+(1− | Sim(φ′, φ)−Sim(ϕi, ϕ) |)·Sim(ϕ′, φ)
for i = 1, . . . ,m. ~s is not a probability distribution. The
multiplying factor Sim(ϕ′, φ) limits the variation of prob-
ability to those formulae whose ontological context is not
too far away from the observation. The posterior ~p(φ′,φ) is
defined to be the normalisation of ~s.
6 Uncertainty in Preferences
Agent α’s preferences is a relation defined over a set, S,
where s1 ≺α s2, s1, s2 ∈ S denotes “α prefers s2 to s1”.
When discussing preferences in negotiation, the set S is of-
ten the outcome space. Elements in an outcome space may
be described either by the world being in a certain state or
by a concept in the ontology having a certain value. If an
agent knows its preferences then it may use results from
game theory or decision theory to achieve a preferred out-
come in some sense. For example, an agent may prefer the
concept of price (from the ontology) to have lower values
than higher, or to purchase wine when it is advertised at a
discount (a world state).
In practice, the articulation of a preference relation may
not be simple, particularly across a large multi-issue space.
Consider the problem of specifying a preference relation
for a collection of fifty cameras with different features,
from different makers, with different prices, both new and
second-hand. This is a multi-issue evaluation problem. It is
realistic to suggest that “a normal intelligent human being”
may not be able to place the fifty cameras in a preference
ordering with certainty, or even to construct a meaningful
probability distribution to describe it. The complexity of ar-
ticulating preferences over real negotiation spaces poses a
practical limitation on the application of preference-based
strategies.
In contract negotiation the outcome of the negotiation,
(a′, b′), is the enactment of the commitments, (a, b), in that
contract, where a is α’s commitment and b is β’s. Some
of the great disasters in market design [3], for example the
Australian Foxtel fiasco, could have been avoided if the de-
signers had considered how the agents were expected to
enact (a′, b′) their commitments (a, b) after the contract is
signed.
Consider a contract (a, b), and let (Ptα(a′|a),Ptα(b′|b))
denote α’s estimate of what will be enacted by α and β re-
spectively if (a, b) is signed. Further assume that the pair of
distributions Ptα(a′|a) and Ptα(b′|b) are independent2, and
that α is able to estimate Ptα(a′|a) with confidence. α will
only be confident in her estimate of Ptα(b′|b) if β’s actions
are constrained by norms, or if α has established a high de-
gree of trust in β. If α is unable to estimate Ptα(b′|b) with
reasonable certainty then put simply: she won’t know what
she is signing. For a utilitarian α, (a1, b1) ≺α (a2, b2) if she
prefers (Ptα(a′2|a2),Ptα(b′2|b2)) to (Ptα(a′1|a1),Ptα(b′1|b1))
in some sense.
7 Summary
Information-based agency integrates in an homogeneous
agent architecture the exchange of information and the ne-
gotiation of norms and contracts using a rich communica-
tion language. These agents’ world models are manipulated
by the agent’s proactive and reactive machinery using ideas
from information theory.
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